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The disintegration of the finance industry in the US has hit investors hard. Across the globe, buyers of structured
products linked to Lehman Brothers have seen their investments wiped out. Some victims have cried foul, claiming
that the underlying risks in the complicated instruments were not adequately explained to them. In Singapore, the
MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) has appointed an independent committee to oversee the review and
resolution of customer complaints.
Tan Chong Hui, professor of quantitative finance at Singapore Management University, has this advice especially for
retail investors of structured products: caveat emptor or ‘buyer beware’.
“Customers need to carefully examine and understand what they are investing in, especially when there are no
guarantees,” he cautioned. “It is important to properly understand, monitor and manage financial risk. The underlying
message from the recent crisis is clear. Do not take any chances with packages of risk -- as these certainly are --
so that you can avoid being overly surprised should risks turn into reality.”
Structured Products Menu
A structured product is a combination of simpler financial instruments put together by ‘structurers’ in financial
institutions, supported by a chain of people involved in products pricing, accounting, legality, marketing and sales.
Structured products may include assets such as stocks and bonds, as well as basic derivatives such as vanilla
options and credit default swaps, some of which have been blamed for the current financial crisis.
“Structured products are developed with profiles of risk and return. By mixing and matching basic instruments, the
right combination can be found to suit investors with different appetites for risk,” explained Tan. For instance,
structured products often come in the form of structured notes which, like bonds, give periodic coupons and a lump
redemption at maturity.
But unlike bonds, a structured note is sugarcoated with the promise of, or the potential for, boosted cash flows.
Thus, bond investors who do not have the stomach for stock or commodity market fluctuations -- but are
disenchanted with low interest rates -- are enticed into taking bigger risk whilst the impression of safety is
preserved, according to Tan.
He described, as an example of a common structure, the equity-linked note with principal-protection. “The invested
principal is divided into two portions. One goes into the purchase of a safe bond, and the other is put into risky
instruments such as stocks or options. The portion of the principal that constitutes the safe bond is carefully
balanced with the coupon or interest rate to ensure that it grows back into an amount that is equal to the invested
principal at maturity. The portion that gets invested in risky assets provides the potential for higher coupons and
bears the brunt of price fluctuations and possible losses.”
Derivatives are like Insurance Policies
 While higher coupons in equity-linked notes may or may not be realised, yield-enhancement structured notes claim
upfront to give higher coupons. This is done through the sale of derivatives which function somewhat like insurance
policies,  according to Tan.
“Investors purchase a structured note whose boosted coupons are funded by the sale of derivatives, equivalent to
that of the insurer who sells away an insurance policy. The periodic premiums add to the otherwise low coupons so
that, if the product matures without event, the investor ends up with a good deal. However, the invested principal
can be drawn upon to cover the loss faced by the counterparty who bought the derivative from the original
investor,” he explained. A note structured in this way gives up protection of the principal in exchange for statedly
higher coupons.
Derivatives that are sold to boost coupons can be options or credit default swaps. Options may be sold at
successive intervals to collect periodic premiums. If the option expires in the money, the counterparty who bought
the option has to be paid. In the case of credit default swaps, periodic payments are collected from the
counterparty who purchased the swap to insure against a predefined credit event.
If no credit event occurs, the owner of the structured note enjoys an investment well made. If a credit event does
occur, the periodic collections are halted and part or whole of the principal invested in the structured note is used
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to reimburse the counterparty. “Just as an insurance event may be defined by many complex clauses, the definition
of a credit event can be complicated,” Tan pointed out.
Structured products are complex as they are made up of several basic financial instruments. Each component adds
risk and a layer of non-transparency to the finished product. “Much of this complexity, though, is hidden from
investors who can find it difficult to gauge whether they are getting their money's worth from the investment,” he
said.
“In assembling a structured product, the structurer needs to purchase the constituent contracts, pay off the
service providers, and also charge a fee as remuneration. All of this is so opaque that only those closely associated
with the structuring industry are able to reliably estimate the breakdown of costs and fees.”
Role of Financial Engineering
Financial engineering as a discipline arose in the 1980s, and has its roots in the academic work of Fisher Black,
Myron Scholes and Robert Merton a decade or so earlier. Merton and Scholes won the Nobel Prize in Economics for
explaining how financial derivatives ought to be priced.
“Financial engineering enables the quantification of risk and the possibility of putting prices to a myriad of financial
contracts,” said Tan. “Despite the mathematical technicalities, the underlying principle is actually very simple. If
there were an open market for an instrument, the price of the instrument will be determined by market supply and
demand forces. If the instrument is not traded freely in an open market, then it is compared to other instruments
which are, and the price is derived thereof.”
The comparison on the basis of similar cash flows and risk profiles is usually imperfect, and financial engineers are
enlisted to make the necessary computations in order to obtain a price. As the finance industry competes
unrelentingly for investor dollars, basic products are assembled into ever more complex ones. At the core is the
fundamental belief that these engineers know how to price risk.
“This is roughly true in the life insurance industry as human demographics vary only gradually over time and
insurance premiums can be adjusted accordingly,” observed Tan. “But when applied to the highly interconnected and
unpredictable finance industry, such a belief is foolhardy.”
Professional traders, investors and speculators who do grasp financial intricacies watch the market closely and
constantly adjust their estimates of prices and risk as the market evolves. Sometimes they may fail to anticipate a
sudden turn of events -- such as the recent restriction on the short selling of financial stocks -- and thereby lose a
lot of money. “But they know what they are in for and it is fair game for them,” said Tan. “The same cannot be
justifiably said for amateur investors who have the virtues of structured products extolled to them and the intrinsic
risk downplayed.”
To Risk or Not to Risk?
In an open market, the expected yields of investment products of a similar quality should be about the same. If
these differ significantly, there could be two reasons, according to Tan. “One, a product has not been correctly
priced. This occurs when there is an error in the computation of the price or the market prices of the underlying
instruments have changed. Issuers of structured products commonly protect themselves from mispricing by
incorporating a call feature which allows them to cancel the contracts with the appropriate reimbursement of funds.
Two, the risk levels of the two products are different.”
A structured note that has enhanced yield from the sale of derivatives does not guarantee its principal, and may
suffer a capital loss when a credit event occurs. An ordinary bond may have comparatively lower coupons but the
investor does not have to worry about credit events. An equity-linked note may have the possibility of giving higher-
than-average coupons, but that is counterbalanced by the possibility of lower-than-average coupons.
Despite the uncertainty in prices and yields, this risk is nevertheless explicit in a structured product. The
complicated nature of how a structure is put together means that the failure of any party that is involved in the
setup may have detrimental consequences to the continued effectiveness of the contract, even if the structure is
proclaimed to be principal-protected.
“This issue of counterparty risk is much less explicitly mentioned and commonly glossed over by investors -- even
though the relevant clauses exist in the contract or are implicit in contractual obligations,” Tan pointed out. “The
tradeoff between risk and return is fundamental to finance just as the law of conservation of mass is to physics.”
Educating Retail Investors
The packaging of basic instruments into structured products with specific investment goals and risk profiles has
opened up investment opportunities -- ordinarily available only to professionals or wealthy individuals -- to the
general public. However, the sale of structured products needs to be better tailored to laypersons who, in turn,
must also be prepared to do their homework. 
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“Some of the descriptions of risk and return may require an understanding of how the relevant financial markets
work,” said Tan. “Although risk and yield are equally pertinent to a structured product, for marketing reasons yields
are usually highlighted more.” He strongly advocates that education, and the accurate representation and
dissemination of information be integral to the sale of structured products. One way is for management to devise an
appropriate set of incentives for sales persons to better align personal goals with their roles as advisors.
“Proper product understanding for investors allows them to make wise investment choices and stay away from risks
which they cannot fathom. What that means is that the investor will have to know whether capital losses can be
incurred, the maximum loss that can be incurred, and the circumstances under which that will happen. As retail
investors do not normally take excessive risk, the issue of capital protection should be the priority in consideration.
Only when that is sorted out should one proceed to think about the yield potential of the instrument.” 
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